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Risto Saarinen 
 
 
The story of the German term Anerkennung is a short story that begins with Fichte and Hegel 
and is continued until today in the footsteps of Hegel. However, if we consider the 
intellectual history of the term recognition as it is expressed through the Latin verbs agnosco 
and recognosco and their English equivalents acknowledge and recognize, this history is 
much longer. This long history is essential for the theological and ecumenical process of 
recognition, as I show in my new book in detail.1 
 
I 
 
In this book I make a distinction between three phases of the intellectual and theological 
history of the concept of recognition. The first phase covers the period from the New 
Testament to the Middle Ages. During this period, expressions like “recognition of the truth” 
and “recognition of God” (agnitio veritatis, agnitio Dei) are often used in the context of 
conversion. With this connection, the change and transformation of the recognizing subject 
become emphasized. Also the recognized object can change its status, for instance, when the 
process of legal adoption was called “recognition of the child” (agnitio filii). However, it is 
the change of the recognizing subject that is highlighted during this first historical period or 
phase.  
     The second phase from the medieval period to the Enlightenment is captured with the 
phrase “promise of self-preservation”. In the feudal recognition ceremony between the lord 
and his servants, the servants are promised a use of land, food and protection. The lord is also 
a beneficiary, as he receives hands for labor and military service. The vocabulary of favors, 
benefits, promises, protection and self-preservation is also prominent in the religious texts of 
this period. Both the recognizing subject and the recognized object undergo a status change in 
this mutual bond of recognition.  
     After the Enlightenment, the act of recognition is predominantly understood as a 
performative that changes the status of the recognized object. Hegel is still to some extent an 
adherent of the earlier period. When later Hegelians start to speak about mutual recognition, 
they mean, however, a composition of two acts which both aim at changing the status of its 
object. The legal and diplomatic acts of recognition are normally understood in this manner, 
that is, as the status change of the recognized object. When Schleirmacher says in §109 of his 
Glaubenslehre that God recognizes human beings in the act of justification, he already 
participates in this third phase of our history.  
      In the following, I use the distinction between three historical phases to undertake a 
systematic investigation of the following questions. Is it possible and legitimate today, to go 
back to the language of the first phase of the early Christianity? Can we still nowadays 
understand the act of ecumenical recognition as an expression of conversion or, maybe, 
promise? I am advocating the thesis that we can and should do this even today. In other 
                                                 
1 For the following, see Risto Saarinen, Recognition and Religion, Oxford 2016. I 
have treated the German terminology in Risto Saarinen, Johann Joachim Spalding und die 
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words, a theological and ecumenical recognition does not only concern the object of this act 
but also the transformation of the subject who recognizes others.  
     Let us keep in mind that the so-called mutual recognition has a slightly different meaning 
from that which I am advocating. I can recognize your baptism and you can recognize mine, 
but in this mutual act the subject is not transforming itself by means of the act. De facto I may 
become transformed through this mutual recognition, but not through my being the subject 
but simply because we are both objects of the act performed by the other. My proposal says 
something slightly different, namely, that the very act of recognition already changes and 
transforms its subject, the one who recognizes. This is the most ancient paradigm of 
recognition in Christianity. 
 
II 
 
Why should the first historical phase, that is, the understanding of recognition as conversion, 
be again our model? The brief reply is that ecumenism through conversion is a classical 
ecumenical paradigm to which our Societas already devoted an entire conference fourteen 
years ago in Salisbury.2 I will, however, give a longer answer and a new argument in favor of 
this classical paradigm. I will do it with the help of Paul Ricoeur’s ecumenical thinking, as it 
has been recently investigated by Beate Bengard.3  
      The French Protestant philosopher Ricoeur was interested in ecumenism through his 
entire career but did not participate in any official dialogues. Instead he displayed sympathy 
with the French Taizé movement and organized already in 1968 an ecumenical 
intercommunion service between Protestants and Catholics. Bengard pays attention to a late 
lecture of Ricoeur, in which the French Protestant philosopher deals with the Lutheran – 
Roman Catholic Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification, discussing its ecumenical 
method. Bengard publishes the German text of the lecture and offers an extensive 
commentary, in which she connects Ricoeur’s thoughts on ecumenism with his general 
hermeneutics.4  
     According to Ricoeur, the achieved consensus in the doctrine of justification is 
foundational and necessary for serious ecumenical work. In spite of this praise, he also thinks 
that the ecumenical potential of the Joint Declaration remains inevitably rather limited. This 
is because Ricoeur thinks that a faith conviction cannot be reduced to a set of objective 
doctrine in the usual manner of ecumenical documents. In reality, however, the identity of the 
churches is a narrative identity which emerges in historical processes and remains connected 
to the perspective of the subject undergoing these processes. A seemingly objective set of 
doctrines reduces this dynamic, narrative perspective to isolated sentences. 5 
     For Ricoeur, the act of personal and communal faith is oriented to the so-called 
constellations of meaning, which together constitute the perspective of the one who trusts or 
has faith. Ricoeur compares such constellations to an act of conversion: 
                                                 
2 Bekehrung und Identität: Ökumene als Spannung zwischen Fremdem und 
Vertrautem (Beiheft zur Ökumenischen Rundschau 73), Frankfurt 2003. 
3 Beate Bengard, Rezeption und Anerkennung: die ökumenische Hermeneutik von 
Paul Ricoeur im Spiegel aktueller Dialogprozesse in Frankreich, Göttingen 2015. 
4 Bengard, Rezeption und Anerkennung, 107-190, 329-335. 
5 Bengard, Rezeption und Anerkennung, 329-334 (here the German version of 
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 When Paul Claudel, for instance, converts to Catholicism on a Christmas eve, leaning 
on a pillar of the Cathedrale Notre-Dame in Paris, he does not confess a certain 
number of sentences from the collection of the articles of faith. Instead, he adheres to 
the organic  whole, having an instinct of its spiritual coherence. He turns himself, so 
to say, to the Catholicism of his times as a whole, displaying a boldness in faith and 
trust towards a tradition which is identified by the proper name of a person. The title, 
the authority and the radiance or this person is regarded as salvific. This is precisely 
what I mean with the provisory term constellation of meaning. In this manner, the 
more or less edified doctrinal formulations of great Christian confessions offer 
themselves to be appropriated in thought and in heart.6 
    For Ricoeur, the decisive ecumenical event is the interpersonal encounter of the faithful. 
The objective doctrines and texts are important in their capacity to witness to this 
foundational event. They tell about the friendship and hospitality, the primary sources of the 
event of approaching one another. Ricoeur relates skeptically to theoretical concepts of unity, 
as his hermeneutics proceeds from the alterity of the other and the plurality of identities and 
perspectives. In this manner, the person of the faithful has primary relevance. The abstract 
texts and conceptions of unity cannot and should not ignore the foundationally personal 
character of all human beings.7 
     Following these premises, Ricoeur is also skeptical towards the so-called global ethics 
project of Hans Küng. According to Ricoeur, we cannot speak abstractly about the common 
ethical doctrines different religions, as each religious conviction understands these teachings 
within the framework of its own constellation of meaning. Normative texts are not the real 
issue, but the persons who adhere to these constellations of meaning in a perspectival 
manner.8  
    Ricoeur’s position has some similarities with the Life-and-Work wing of the ecumenical 
movement which sometimes relates critically to theoretical doctrinal dialogue. On the other 
hand, Ricoeur does not want to proclaim pragmatism or an anti-intellectual stance. On the 
contrary; as the leading philosopher of the late 20th century Ricoeur aims at showing that the 
personal being of all faithful and the narrative identity of faith communities cannot be 
reduced to isolated doctrinal statements.  
 
III 
 
In my following ecumenical reflections I adopt Ricoeur’s insight of ecumenism as an 
understanding of the constellations of meaning to which the faithful person attaches himself 
or herself. An attachment to the constellations of meaning is similar to conversion, as these 
events do not only concern the object or the other but they change and transform myself 
through the attachment. In this manner, when I recognize others I am also transformed 
myself. Let me show first that such an insight has, maybe contrary to Ricoeur’s view of 
ecumenism, played a role in the doctrinal talks between Catholics and Lutherans. I now come 
back to the theory of recognition. 
                                                 
6 Bengard, Rezeption und Anerkennung, 331-332, quoting Ricoeur. See also ibid. pp. 
109-110. 
7 Bengard, Rezeption und Anerkennung, 315-328. 
8 Bengard, Rezeption und Anerkennung, 138-144. 
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     In philosophy, the theory of recognition became prominent during the 1990s.9 Ecumenists 
have, however, reflected on this concept extensively already during the 1970s. The point of 
departure for this reflection was given through a German Catholic proposal of an official 
recognition of the Lutheran Augsburg Confession in 1980. Among Catholic theologians, 
Heinrich Fries and Vinzenz Pfnür published theological papers in support of this proposal. 
The project was further supported, at least to some extent, by prominent theologians like 
Walter Kasper and Joseph Ratzinger. However, the Catholic church did not finally move to 
adopt this proposal.10 
    One reason frequently given as to why the project failed was that the concept of 
recognition was not sufficiently elaborated. Others argued that the Catholic understanding of 
this concept was different from the Lutheran one. While Catholics need an extensive 
agreement of doctrine as basis of an act of recognition, Lutherans allegedly employ this act 
for bridging the gap of remaining alterity and plurality. In my new book I present a new 
analysis and interpretation of this discussion of the 1970s. To put it briefly, I think that Paul 
Ricoeur is in many ways, though not completely, right in his critical evaluation of doctrinal 
ecumenism. Let me try to explain this in some detail.  
     The early ecumenical movement adopted the concept of recognition from the international 
law. A legal recognition of another state does not reduce the alterity between the states but 
consolidates it. In similar manner, a Faith and Order discussion paper from 1937 formulates 
as follows:  
To speak of ‘mutual recognition’ is to enter the area of inter-church fellowships. As in 
the case of civil governments ‘recognition’ is a condition of further relationships, so it 
is with the Churches. Mutual recognition may be partial or complete. It does not 
necessarily involve any co-operative action or Corporate Union, though it may be a 
prerequisite of both.11 
     A similar legal use of recognition can be found in the so-called Toronto Declaration 
(1950) of the World Council of Churches. According to this declaration, the member 
churches need not regard other members “as Churches in the true and full sense of the word”. 
They need, however, recognize Jesus as Lord. In addition, they need to “recognize in other 
Churches elements of the true Church … this mutual recognition obliges them to enter into a 
serious conversation with each other in the hope that these elements of truth will lead to the 
recognition of the full truth”.12  
     In this manner, the minimal criterion of membership in the WCC consists in the 
recognition of a third party, that is, Jesus as Lord, or the true Church. In addition, some 
mutual recognition of the true elements of other members. However, the recognizing subject 
need not change its own habits. Generally speaking, the model of legal recognition proceeds 
from the idea of attaching a certain status to the objects of recognition, not from any 
transformation of the recognizing subject. 
                                                 
9 Saarinen, Recognition and Religion, 5-20. 
10 Saarinen, Recognition and Religion, 176-182. For the following, see also Peter 
Gauly, Katholisches Ja zum Augsburger Bekenntnis?, Freiburg 1980 and Gerard Kelly, 
Recognition: Advancing Ecumenical Thinking, Frankfurt 1996. 
11 Meanings of Unity, 18 (Edinburgh 1937 Faith and Order Preparatory Report), 
quouted from Kelly, Recognition, 49-50. 
12 Toronto Declaration, quoted from Documentary History of the Faith and Order 
Movement 1927-1963, ed. Lukas Vischer, St. Louis 1963, 171-175. 
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    Such legal uses of recognition are typical in my so-called third phase in the history of 
recognition. The status change of the recognized object is the exemplary form of this phase. 
Now, the Catholic process of recognizing the Lutheran Augsburg Confession differs 
significantly from this typical model. Especially Walter Kasper and Joseph Ratzinger 
emphasize that recognition is an interpersonal act which has a deep spiritual dimension. 
Lutheran dialogue partners, for instance, Harding Meyer, adopt this view of interpersonality 
and spirituality.13 The precise theological content of these views remains, however, somewhat 
vague.  
     When we are aware of the long history of recognition, however, we can see that the 
Second Vatican Council readopts the old Latin concept of agnosco, agnitio. In the Decree on 
Ecumenism this concept is employed seven times, often in quite significant places. The 
Decree says of non-Catholics that “all who have been justified by faith in baptism are 
members of Christ’s body, and have a right to be called Christians, and so are deservedly 
recognized (agnoscuntur) as sisters and brothers in the Lord.” It further states of such other 
Christians that “Catholics must gladly acknowledge (agnosco) and esteem the truly Christian 
endowments which derive from our common heritage … It is right and salutary to recognize 
(agnosco) the riches of Christ  and the virtuous deeds in the lives of others.”14 
     In this almost Ricoeurian manner, the Decree on Ecumenism highlights the interpersonal 
nature of recognition. The Latin word agnosco has also a certain emphasis on the subject; for 
this reason, the act of recognition emphasizes the attitude and openness of Catholics in their 
recognition of others. This openness is also visible when the Decree says that Catholics 
“must recognize (agnoscendum est) the admirable way in which they [the theological 
traditions of the eastern churches] have their roots in holy scripture”.15 Such acts of 
recognition do not concern merely the legal status of their object but they witness to the 
interpersonal procedure in which the recognizing subject declares its own openness and new 
perspective.  
     This interpersonal use is also typical for the first steps of papal ecumenism in the 1960s. 
Pope Paul VI considers in his talk to the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul 1967 that charity 
can aid us “to recognize the sameness of faith underlying the differences of vocabulary”. The 
primates of East and West should seek communion “by mutual recognition of each other and 
mutual respect for each other as pastors of that part of the flock of Christ which is entrusted 
to them”.16 In this words we can hear the interpersonal character and spiritual nature of 
recognition. It primarily concerns the speaker’s own openness, not the status change of the 
object.  
                                                 
13 Walter Kasper, Was bedeutet das: Katholische Anerkennung der Confessio 
Augustana?, in: Katholische Anerkennung des Augsburgischen Bekenntnisses?, ed. Harding 
Meyer, Frankfurt 1977; Joseph Ratzinger, Anmerkungen zur Frage einer Anerkennung der 
Confessio Augustana durch die katholische Kirche, MThZ 29 (1978), 225-237; Harding 
Meyer, Anerkennung – ein ökumenischer Schlüsselbegriff, in ders. Versöhnte 
Verschiedenheit, Frankfurt 1998, 120-136. 
14 Unitatis redintegratio, 3-4, 9-10. 
15 Unitatis redintegratio, 16-17. 
16 Doing the Truth in Charity, ed. T. F. Stransky & J. B. Sheerin, New York 1982, 
183-185. 
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    With the help of our long history of recognition we may thus conclude that the Second 
Vatican Council highlights again the old insight of agnitio as the openness and 
transformation of the recognizing subject. In the German discussion regarding the recognition 
of the Augsburg Confession, the contributions of Kasper and Ratzinger likewise focus on this 
interpersonal and subject-oriented meaning of recognition. In this manner, the Catholic-
Lutheran doctrinal ecumenism comes closer to the dynamic perspective of one’s own trust as 
advocated by Paul Ricoeur. The tradition of agnosco is thus fairly close to the ideas of 
conversion and perspectival constellation of meaning.  
     It needs to be added, however, that the spiritual openness of the recognizing subject is 
only one step in the elaborate process of recognition outlined by Ratzinger, Kasper and 
Heinrich Fries. In addition to this openness, they also require considerable theological 
convergence which should be clearly formulated. In this manner, the ecumenical dialogue is 
also very much concerned with the theological position of the Augsburg Confession as 
compared to those of the Catholic church. Let us elaborate also this side somewhat closer. 
 
IV 
 
In an important essay of 1973, Heinrich Fries attempts to define the theological concept of 
recognition. For him, the process of recognition assumes the alterity of the other. This alterity 
can, however, be considered as positive opportunity. Together with alterity, the process needs 
a common ground between the parties. This common ground can overcome the problems 
resulting from alterity. While recognition primarily occurs between persons, these persons 
represent positions and doctrines. For this reason, there is a partial and non-reducible 
overlapping between persons and impersonal matters as objects of recognition. The 
recognizing subject must be aware that she is recognizing persons and non-personal positions 
at the same time. 17 
     Such ecumenical situation of recognition means, so Fries, a unity in legitimate diversity. 
Due to the common ground we can speak of unity which is capable of transforming the 
alterity so that it is legitimate. The process of recognition does not abolish alterity but 
transforms it to a legitimate state. The process does not, however, merely justify the status 
quo, but it transforms both parties through the act of recognition. Finally, it is the common 
ground that makes the ecumenical recognition possible.  
     This conception of Fries is similar to the later Lutheran conception of a “unity is 
reconciled diversity”. It also resembles the so-called “differentiated consensus”, a method 
employed in the Catholic-Lutheran Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification of 
1998. In a differentiated consensus, both parties approve a common doctrinal text. In 
addition, both parties attach to this text a confessional addition or commentary which 
highlights the distinctive positions of each party. However, this commentary also explains 
how these positions are compatible with the common ground shared by both parties.  
     We saw that Paul Ricoeur was not quite satisfied with the ecumenical procedure of Joint 
Declaration, as he considered it to consist overwhelmingly of objective statements of 
doctrine. The perspectival constellation of meaning, resulting inevitably from the alterity, is 
in some sense preserved as the so-called differentiation of agreement. It is, however, 
secondary in the sense that the moving force of the ecumenical unity is rather given by the 
                                                 
17 For the following, see Heinrich Fries, Was heisst Anerkennung der kirchlichen 
Ämter?, SdZ 98 (1973), 507-515 
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common ground expressed as text. In the light of Ricoeur’s narrative identity, it would be 
more adequate if the perspectival openness of the subject would be considered as the primary 
force of ecumenism, as is allegedly the case with the French Taizé movement admired by 
Ricoeur. 
     Given our discussion on the three phases of recognition, we could defend the Joint 
Declaration, arguing that is it nevertheless a late achievement of that Catholic ecumenism 
which started in Vatican II and emphasizes one’s own openness and readiness to spiritual 
renewal. While this aspect may remain secondary in the method of differentiated consensus, 
the method at least assumes the lasting alterity and perspectival approach to doctrine. The 
Catholic approach further admits that we are not merely dealing with the status change of the 
objects recognized but need also a personal transformation in the ecumenical process. 
     At the same time, Ricoeur is nevertheless right in holding that the ideas of personal 
conversion and perspectival constellation of meaning remain secondary in today’s doctrinal 
ecumenism. The Lutheran – Roman Catholic dialogue, for instance, spends most of its effort 
in the refinement of complicated historical and systematic doctrinal talks. In such talks, both 
parties develop a rationalized account of their confessional convictions. This account remains 
oriented to the objects of faith and does not employ its personal and spiritual treasures. 
      Obviously, Ricoeur is not claiming that today’s ecumenists are not spiritual or pious 
enough. Such conclusion would be as false and absurd as the reverse conclusions claiming 
that Ricoeur has no understanding for the intellectual work of doctrinal theologians or that he 
would be an anti-intellectual romantic or relativist. On the contrary, a Ricoeurian view takes 
extremely seriously the perspectival nature of faith and ecclesial life and wants to explain it 
as adequately as possible. 
      As an ecumenist, I would like to propose two different ways which may lead closer to the 
nature of faith as explained by Ricoeur. Let me call them the secure way and the ambitious 
way. The secure way means simply a division of labor between ecumenical experts on the 
one hand and church leaders on the other. The experts can analyze theological issues and 
make different proposals. They also need to say that ecumenical work in not merely 
theological mathematics but it is fundamentally concerned with the concrete recognition of 
others in their alterity. Therefore, the fundamental issue is interpersonal and spiritual and it 
finally belongs to the domain of church leaders.  
    In this division of labor the church leaders trust the expertise of professional ecumenists. 
At the same time, the leaders must also make their own proposals and take initiatives, 
sometimes even unexpected ones. Because the recognition of others is an interpersonal, 
spiritual and existential issue, the spiritual leaders need to use their own social capital and 
spiritual discernment. Sometimes the experts may even say that something means a new turn 
in the policy of the church, but this should not prevent the church leaders to take creative 
steps of interpersonal recognition. 
     The ambitious way gives the ecumenical experts an additional task, namely, the 
elaboration of subjective and interpersonal matters so that their dynamics can be better 
understood. Such a task may look similar to Ricoeur’s hermeneutical procedures. In addition 
to their theological competence, the experts would need to have competence in social 
sciences, psychology and philosophy. As a discipline, such ecumenical theology might 
belong to pastoral theology rather than to systematic theology.  
     It may be that none of us is really competent to proceed on such ambitious way, simply 
because we do not have the intellectual capacity of Paul Ricoeur. As a theoretical option, 
however, I do think that it is possible to understand the group dynamics of Christian churches 
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in their evaluation of alterity much better than we do today. Such understanding would give 
us better information about the so-called constellations of meaning available in our 
communal and individual faith convictions.  
     In sum, the most important theological criterion in our recognition of others is our own 
openness and readiness to change. Only such people who can practice metanoia with regard 
to themselves are capable of recognizing other people and become recognized by them. This 
insight is no modern invention but it is the core content of the biblical Greek expression 
epignosis tes aletheias as well as its Latin equivalents agnitio veritatis and agnitio Dei. 18In 
Lutheran theology, our trust in God is the source of our own openness. 
     
     
       
                                                 
18 Saarinen, Recognition and Religion, offers a detailed history of these concepts and 
expressions in theological texts. 
